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Evaluating Pension Insurance Pricing
David F. Babbel
Introduction
Significant progress has been made since I first reviewed the PIMS model some 17 years
ago, and I applaud the painstaking efforts to create a model sufficiently rich in detail to
encompass many and perhaps most of the complexities that face PBGC in carrying out its
mission. In particular, the PIMS model has taken on the Herculean task of modeling in detail and
under many scenarios the cash outflows associated with the pension obligations they have
assumed. I commend them for this work.
My comments are focused almost entirely upon PBGC’s termination liabilities. They will
touch upon several areas that are germane to carrying out PBGC’s valuation and insurance
pricing mission, are complementary to the cash flow modeling they have already done, and
which by comparison are relatively easy to implement. All of them will help the PIMS model to
be more firmly ensconced in principles consistent with fundamental financial economics, which
is a precursor to adequate insurance pricing. I will address four issues I deem most pressing: (1)
the need to discount the liability stream by current riskless interest rates instead of using
corporate bond rates that reflect credit risk, call risk, and other risks, or using some ad hoc
prescribed average of past rates; (2) the need to use the entire term structure of interest rates; (3)
the need to employ more useful investment management benchmarks; and (4) the way to
implement a relevant and rigorous liability benchmark.

The research reported herein was pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as
part of the Retirement Research Consortium (RRC); the author also acknowledges support from The Pension
Research Council at The Wharton School. The author is grateful for helpful discussions with Olivia Mitchell and
Mark Meyer. However, all findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the
views of the SSA or any agency of the federal government, the MRRC, the PRC, The Wharton School at the
University of Pennsylvania, or Charles River Associates.

Insights from Financial Economics on Proper Discount Rates 1
One of the most significant advances in private pension valuation that has occurred over
the past few years was the adoption by the accounting and actuarial professions of a set of
discount rate protocols that result in valuations closer to their fundamental economic value (i.e.,
their present value) than what was reported years ago. 2 These revised standards were having a
beneficial, albeit short-lived spillover impact on the discount rates used by PBGC, as plan
sponsors had to begin shoring up their insufficient assets. 3 When coupled with the commendable

1

An early discussion on the valuation of corporate pension liabilities, from a corporate

viewpoint, is provided by Bulow (1982, pp. 436-7) in which conditions are specified under
which well-funded corporate pensions should be valued at riskless rates of interest. In the case of
“a severely underfunded plan, the firm’s pension liability is less than the present value of
workers’ benefits. The difference is made up by PBGC through its ‘insurance’ program, and is
often referred to as the ‘pension put’” (Bulow, Mørck, and Summers, 1987, p. 84).
2

Not everyone is on board with the new discount rate protocols, as evidenced by the recent

debate raging in the Wall Street Journal between finance professionals and actuaries. The
actuaries charged with valuing public pensions continue to discount them by the returns they
expect on the supporting asset portfolios based on historical rates of return rather than by current
rates that reflect the characteristics of promised payouts to pensioners and current cots of
meeting them. See Andy Kessler’s “The Pension Rate-of-Return Fantasy” (op-ed, April 10, 2013
and the three rebuttal Letters to the Editor appearing on April 19, 2013.
3

The beneficial effect was reversed, however, with the recent mandated changes in discounting

protocols, which will be discussed later.

initiative the current administration has recently proposed to let PBGC determine its own
insurance rates, we are on the threshold of substantial advancement, but setting premium rates
adequately will require proper valuation of pension liabilities that the assets and premiums are
designed and required to fund.
In the past, private pension liabilities were discounted by expected returns on the asset
portfolios supporting them, according to various accounting and actuarial standards. This
resulted in a strong temptation for some plan sponsors, fiduciary duties notwithstanding, to rush
to the bottom of the investment quality spectrum, as using the higher discount rates generally
associated with lower quality assets could result in lower reported values of pension liabilities,
higher reported plan surpluses (or lower reported plan deficits), and better-looking financials for
the firm. The absurdity of this earlier approach is that by making pension asset portfolios riskier
through loading the asset portfolio with low-grade bonds and equities, the linked discount rates
on liabilities could make much of the reported liabilities vanish.4 Unfortunately, but predictably,
many plan sponsors succumbed to this temptation, which led, in part, to heavy claims upon
PBGC. This would have been less likely to happen had pension liabilities been properly valued
in the first place.
Below I will discuss three lines of thinking in financial economics that support the use of
riskless interest rates for valuing PBGC termination liabilities.

4

Above, I underscored “reported” for a good reason, and invoke Abraham Lincoln’s observation

to justify it. Said he, “If you call a tail a leg, how many legs has a horse? Five? No, four. Calling
a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg.” Similarly, reporting a liability at a reduced value does not
reduce its actual value at all.

The cost of funds is determined by the use of funds, not their source. If investor X provides
me with $100,000 to invest, and I provide her returns that are identical in riskiness to the S&P
500 returns over time, she will expect of me returns commensurate with the S&P 500. If, on the
other hand, I provide her returns that are identical in risk with Treasury bills, she will require of
me returns commensurate with T-bills. In both cases, the source of funds is the same investor,
but the cost of capital differs, depending on the use of funds. This is a fundamental economic
insight from corporate finance as well as securities markets. If the investor doesn’t like the return
pattern she is receiving, she can recoup her entire investment by selling her income stream rights
to someone who is perfectly happy with that return pattern and then turn around and invest her
funds with a manager who accedes to her risk/return preferences. Indeed, the same investor may
require several different rates of return for separate components of her overall portfolio, each
exhibiting distinct patterns of returns. Thus, the cost of funds is not determined by their source,
but by their use.
In the case of private pensions, the plan sponsor makes funded promises and backs those
promises with supplemental funding, if necessary. In the event of problems, PBGC guarantees
the payments, both in terms of timing and amounts, up to the statutory maximum annual
payment for each pensioner. Thus, from the plan beneficiaries’ standpoint, the payments are
riskless; hence, it is appropriate to utilize riskless rates of interest to present-value those
payments that are fixed, and within the statutory limit. As for PBGC, it is responsible only for
those payments within the statutory limit, so it should also value them by using the appropriate
riskless rates of interest.
Disparate expected returns have same certainty-equivalent riskless return. Expected and
required rates of returns depend upon the relevant risks assumed. As far as I am aware, none of

the prevailing valuation models used in modern finance would justify discounting PBGC
termination liabilities with bond yields that incorporate risks not germane to PBGC or its
beneficiaries (e.g., credit risk, illiquidity, call risk, etc.). 5 Moreover, there has never been an
accepted finance theory or valuation model that would calculate the present cost of funding an
existing guaranteed pension liability using an average of past rates of interest – whether riskless
or risky. As I understand it, by the time a pension liability has been transferred to PBGC, the
pension is closed to further contributions, and liabilities are fixed going forward, contingent only
upon uncertain longevity. Accordingly, the expected future cash flows can be recast into their
present value by taking into account only the time value of money using appropriate riskless
interest rates. Longevity risk is either not priced directly (as it is diversified among a large
population), or the population longevity drift over time cannot be hedged well using available
traded instruments. In either case, such risk must be handled through the maintenance of an
adequate plan surplus, actuarially determined. But the present value of expected future cash
flows is computed using appropriate risk-free interest rates.
Prevailing asset pricing models show how expected rates of return adjust to reflect the
relevant risks assumed by investing in a set of assets or pricing a set of liabilities. In some
models, those priced risks include only those that are non-diversifiable. In others, they may relate
to factors that the market considers priced factors, while ignoring the rest. In any case, the
models arrive at similar riskless rates of interest. If retirement payments were merely a pass-

5

An excellent, non-technical review of mainstream financial thought regarding the valuation of

pensions is provided by the former editor of the Financial Analysts Journal in the Editors Corner
column, which is highly recommended reading. See Arnott (1995).

through from the supporting asset portfolio, such as in a typical 401(k) defined contribution
program, it would be appropriate to value the “pensions” using discount rates similar to those
characteristic of the asset portfolio, which would render them at the current market value of
assets. However, it would be totally inappropriate to value guaranteed, fixed pension liabilities
based on the riskiness of the supporting asset portfolio, when the recipients of the pensions are
promised and guaranteed timely and full payments of prescribed amounts. This is true whether
the asset portfolio is maintained by the corporate plan sponsor or PBGC. 6
The Merton Model can be used to show the pension valuation components. In the spirit of
the Merton Model (1974), the market value of a pension liability to a corporate plan sponsor, L,
can be decomposed into two components: its present value taking into account only the time
value of money, PV(L), and reduced by the option devolving from limited liability to default
upon the required payments and put the obligation to PBGC, PO. This latter expression is known
by plan sponsors as “the PBGC put.” Thus,
𝐿 = 𝑃𝑉(𝐿) − 𝑃𝑂

The value of this put option implicitly held by the corporate plan sponsor will vary,
depending on how adequately the plan is funded. This will be a function of the amount of plan
surplus, the nature of the assets and surplus supporting the pension promises, and the
corporation’s ability to supplement these, when necessary. The PO will be more valuable to the
corporation under two circumstances: by having inadequate surplus in the plan, and by having
assets whose cash flow characteristics diverge from those of the plan’s obligations, which we

6

I am abstracting here from any “haircut” that might be imposed on certain plan liabilities above

the statutory coverage limits that are transferred to PBGC from the corporate plan sponsor.

will call an asset-liability mismatch. The risks of a mismatch can be alleviated with sufficient
surplus. Absent such a surplus, assets that are subject to default or to value swings different than
those swings in liability values will pose a risk to the pension plan that increases the value of the
put option to default. This put option value will be increased further to the extent that the
corporation has inadequate resources to supplement the plan assets in the event of an adverse
swing in mismatched asset and liability values. If the plan assets are default free and the asset
and liability cash flows are appropriately matched, there will be no adverse effects occasioned by
changing market conditions upon the economic balance sheet of the plan sponsor, because plan
surplus will be immunized from such changes. The excuse for mismatching assets and liabilities
in an attempt to smooth the impact of changing market conditions on the accounting balance
sheet is a reflection only of accounting concerns and the actuarial practices that accommodate
them, where the reporting protocols are designed in a way that is inconsistent with the underlying
economics. We will not concern ourselves with these accounting issues, as they are beyond the
scope of our economic analysis and in any case can be ameliorated by prudent and overdue
reforms.
In any case, what relates to PBGC is simply the present value of the pension liability,
adjusted for any statutory limits on benefits paid. It has no offsetting value of a put option to
default to an outside agency other than to the federal government itself, which officially does not
provide a guaranty on private pension obligations beyond that granted by PBGC. Thus, from
PBGC’s standpoint, the present value of expected pension liability payments is what matters,
together with adequate surplus to support adverse deviations in covered population longevity.
Additional surplus would be required to compensate for electing to continue to hold plan assets
with credit risk. Still more surplus would be needed to the extent that PBGC adopts investment

programs inconsistent with maintaining an asset portfolio matched to the timing of its liabilities.
Also, to the extent that PBGC needs funds above and beyond those in its “general account,” it
would presumably borrow from the Treasury at or near Treasury rates. In all of these cases, the
present value of the liabilities is not affected; rather, the amount of surplus required to satisfy the
liabilities is altered.
Exactly what useful information in conveyed by current valuation protocols? Not much.
The information content of what is currently being represented in accounting statements as
private pension liabilities is minimal, and sometimes misleading or unhelpful to PBGC. First of
all, the present value of the liabilities, which is useful information, is simply not provided.
Second, the pension values that are reported do not embed the present value of the pension
liabilities together with the firm-specific “PBGC put.” Thus, from what is provided, the value of
the firm-specific “PBGC put” cannot be discerned because the present values of liabilities cannot
merely be subtracted from reported values to derive the (negative of) “the PBGC put.” The
discount rates used in typical valuations reflect neither the particular plan sponsor’s asset
portfolio nor its plan surplus. For example, consider a plan with long duration default-free assets
backing its liabilities. The plan could still be very risky if the amount of default-free long-term
assets is insufficient to cover fully the liabilities, including an adequate plan surplus to handle
longevity uncertainty. Alternatively, a plan with lots of surplus but with assets that behave quite
differently from the liabilities they must cover may pose just as much risk to PBGC.
The discounting of expected cash flows that is done currently in rendering the reported
private pension liabilities is not based on sponsor-specific or plan-specific risk factors. Instead,
pension values that are reported typically use discount factors that incorporate an amalgam of
various long-term investment grade corporate bond yields which may have very little to do with

a particular plan sponsor’s financial situation or the portfolio supporting its liabilities. If that
blending of such yields is weighted by the market values of issued bonds, the single-A-rated
bonds occupy an inordinate share of that average and thus draw the overall average quality
toward the lowest end of bonds in the various A-grades. Even if the categories are equally
weighted, the average yield is below AA quality, as the convexity of yield levels across
descending credit ratings from AAA to A assures an average yield that is between AA and A.
Thus, the base rates used by plan sponsors to discount and report their liabilities are clearly much
higher than those that would reflect the risks of the guaranteed liabilities.
This results in a substantial understating of liabilities by plan sponsors. How substantial?
Assuming an average duration of 14 years for pension liabilities and a 200 basis point spread
between the Treasury discount rates and the lower-than-AA base corporate rates used to discount
the liabilities, I would estimate about a 28% understatement of liabilities, not including the
additional surplus assets required to offset longevity extension risks. 7 When another (on average)

7

Note, PBGC uses factors enlisted by private insures when assuming liabilities of terminated

plans. These factors incorporate a reduction from base reference rates (often A-rated long-term
corporates) to provide for profit and a surplus to cushion against average asset defaults and
adverse experience. However, insurers do not price their pensions to be riskless and occasionally
default on them. In such cases, there may be some coverage granted through state insolvency
guaranty programs, but unlike PBGC coverage, such program coverage is based on the present
value of remaining obligations ranging form $100,000 to $500,000, depending on the state,
rather than covering the full monthly amounts owed (up to the annual statutory limits) over the

150 basis points are added under the MAP-21 25-year smoothing of corporate yields program,
the reported values will underestimate the present-valued cost of funding the liabilities by more
than 49%, not including the money surplus needed to secure the promises. This will result in a
very heavy economic price to pay and an extraordinary burden will be placed on PBGC to pick
up the pieces from the use of these discount factors. Think of it simply. Assets are reported at
current market values, and those values are consistent with current discount rates appropriate to
their risk. The present values of the assets are therefore equal to their market values. However,
the calculated values of the guaranteed liabilities have nothing to do with present values, nor
current discount rates, nor the present cost of funding them, and what discount rates are used
have nothing to do with the guaranteed nature of the payments that must be made to satisfy the
liabilities. Thus, there is simply no way using only current measures of assets and liabilities to
approximate the plan deficits and exposure to PBGC. These protocols place PBGC in an
unenviable position, and the US taxpayers with a potential liability that can be met only if they
are extremely lucky by taking this gamble.
Essentially, what has happened is worse – much worse – than the government issuing
$100 billion in Treasury bonds and investing those proceeds in common stock, junk bonds, and
corporate bonds of varying qualities. If this were a sound bet, why wouldn’t the government
simply issue a couple of trillion dollars and invest the proceeds in the stock market and bond
market, to bail out the deficit? But it is worse, because what the actual bet being conducted is
tantamount to issuing government debt in an amount that is far less than the true value of the

pensioners’ remaining lifetimes. In many cases, the guaranty programs will result in considerably
less coverage for pensioners.

liabilities it is assuming, and taking the inadequate proceeds from the debt issuance and investing
them in risky securities of far lower value than the liabilities being assumed. In such a case, the
risky invested assets must not only do well, but must do extraordinarily well to first close the
deficit before a surplus can begin to be built. Many financial institutions and investors and have
entered into insolvency pursuing such a risky course.

Using the Term Structure of Interest to Discount Liabilities
I understand that by statute, PBGC is directed to derive and use a set of two interest
factors based upon a set of private insurers’ group annuity prices to calculate a value of its
pension liabilities.8 Until this is changed to be more in line with accepted principles of financial
economics, such factors must continue to be used. However, by my way of thinking, just because
PBGC is directed to use a set of discount factors derived from private insurers’ group annuity
prices (together with an assumed mortality table) to calculate a value does not mean that it
cannot also conduct further analysis to determine the actual present values of its liabilities. In
fact, if it wishes to set premiums pursuant to the plan risks it assumes, such calculations would
be required as a first step in understanding the risks imposed upon it.
I see no compelling reason today for PBGC, or anyone else for that matter, to estimate
the value of pension liabilities using a single interest rate factor, or even two interest rate factors,
each applying to a different band of timing for cash flows. Seventeen years ago this had some
merit from a practical viewpoint, as there were many different term structure of spot interest rate

8

The procedure is explained in http://www.pbgc.gov/news/other/res/pbgc-procedure-interest-

factors.html.

(pure discount) models but none readily available in the public domain. Today there is an
excellent term structure of spot interest rates model in the public domain, updated daily by the
Federal Reserve. It has passed the test of time and certainly provides adequate estimates of the
spot interest rates that apply to each term to maturity. 9
An alternative and equally good way to derive appropriate interest rate factors is to
simply use the yields of zero-coupon Treasury STRIPS of various maturities. These are available
daily on any Bloomberg terminal. The interest rate factors from such instruments will closely
approximate those from the Federal Reserve model. 10
A third way to estimate the value of pension liabilities is by using stochastic interest rate
models. It has been shown elsewhere that where cash flows are contingent on emerging future
interest rates, it is necessary to utilize stochastic interest rate valuation models to properly model
the cash flows and capture their present values. However, where the cash flows are fixed by
contract, and related only to factors (e.g., uncertain longevity) that are not contingent upon
interest rates, you will get the same exact present value whether you use the present term
structure of interest rates to value the cash flows or a suitable stochastic interest rate valuation
model. 11 Indeed, the way that stochastic interest rate valuation models are calibrated is to ensure

9

See

Gurkaynak,

Sack,

and

Wright

(2007)

with

data

posted

at:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/
10

Suffice it to say that because of the greater fungibility of coupon strips relative to principal

strips, a yield curve based on coupon strips is generally preferred for valuation purposes. See
Sack (2000).
11

The various classes of stochastic interest rate models are detailed in Babbel and Merrill (2000).

that they render the same present values as term structure models do when applied to fixed future
cash flows. Clearly, then, there is no need to go through the hassle of using stochastic interest
rate valuation models to determine the present values of such cash flows, which would be
characteristic of fixed pensions in payout mode. However, in the case of pensions that are still in
the accumulation phase, there may be future payouts that are contingent on the evolution of wage
or price inflation, which are at least loosely related to nominal interest rates over time. In such
cases, the employment of stochastic interest rate valuation models could be indicated. An
alternative is to utilize the real term structure of interest published daily by the Federal
Reserve, 12 when cash flows are related to emerging inflation rates.
One reason to avoid use of interest rate factors derived from a survey of insurers’ annuity
prices is that their annuity prices conflate various elements that should have no bearing on what
it costs PBGC to cover such plans. More will be said about this below.
Another reason is that the annuity prices quoted by many insurers are typically based on
yields-to-maturity of long-term AA-rated or A-rated bonds. From those yields are subtracted a
number of basis points to adjust for adverse selection, longevity risk, capital contribution, and in
some cases expected asset defaults. (For example, in the 1980s and early 1990’s, investment
banks and insurers would often use the long-term A-rated bond yields, subtract 75 basis points
from them, and then discount projected benefits in determining the liability for assuming a
pension.) Moreover, insurers have the protections of limited liability, as they do have the option
to default on their obligations.

12

See: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest

rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data= realyield

A third reason to avoid the use of interest rate factors derived from a survey of insurers’
group annuity prices is that the resulting (essentially equivalent) yields-to-maturity themselves
are not useful except in valuing something whose value is already known. 13 They cannot be used
to value something with cash flows that are any different than those of the particular instrument
from which they were derived. Spot rates of interest, on the other hand, can be used properly to
value anything whose cash flows are either fixed beforehand or are otherwise independent of the
evolution of interest rates over time.
A fourth reason stems from the fact that a bond’s yield-to-maturity can be approximated
by the dollar-duration weighted average of the underlying spot rates of interest. 14 Because a
long-term bond typically has a cash payment of principal at maturity that is perhaps twenty to
sixty times higher than the size of the intervening cash flows from interest, and because its
payment date is twenty to thirty years away, the dollar duration of principal repayment is huge
relative to any other payment. This places an inordinate weight upon the single underlying spot
rate of interest associated with that particular cash flow in deriving its contribution to the
calculated yield-to-maturity. While this may work with ordinary bonds, I know of no pension
payout pattern that could justify placing such a weight on one particular cash flow far distant into
the future. The distortion by using a discount factor ultimately based on such a yield to value
pensions is particularly pronounced if there is slope (either positive or negative) in the term
structure of spot rates of interest. Therefore, I can see no justification for using an interest rate
factor that is ultimately based on underlying bond yields-to-maturity.

13

14

See Santomero and Babbel (2001: 77, 99-101).
A proof is provided by Santomero and Babbel (2001: 150-151).

An argument against using the term structure of spot interest rates for valuing pension
liabilities is that the pension obligations and payouts may extend far beyond the 30-year
maximum range of the term structure. Of course, this limitation applies equally to the use of
yields-to-maturity, which also typically max out at around 30 years. One approach is to simply
apply the longest spot interest rate available to cash flows exceeding the range of the term
structure. This approach, however, will surely result in an undervaluation of distant cash flows.
The primary reason for this is that positive “gain from convexity” grows as a function of the
square of duration. 15 This is apparent in Figure 1, Panels A-C, examined closely. In the latter two
panels, a secant is drawn between the high and low values of 30-year and 60-year zeros,

15

The term “gain from convexity” is defined as the asymmetrically positive gain in value that is

associated with a decrease in interest rates relative to the lower loss in value that would occur
with an equal rise in interest rates. The asymmetry arises simply from the mathematics of
geometric discounting factors, where the discount factors are raised to exponents reflecting the
terms to maturity. For example, a 50 b.p. drop in yields from 8% to 7.5% on a 15-year zerocoupon bond will produce a $22.73 rise in the value of a bond, from $315.24 to $337.97,
whereas a 50 b.p. rise in yields to 8.5% will result in a price drop of only $21.06 in that same
bond. (In these calculations, I have used straightforward spot rates of interest to discount the cash
flows, and not the contrived bond-equivalent yields used in practice, although the point remains
the same.) As maturity lengthens, a zero-coupon bond will reflect an increasingly greater
disparity in price rises versus price declines, as the mathematics of geometric compounding
become more pronounced. A description of gain from convexity, its calculation and importance
is given by Santomero and Babbel op cit, pp. 153-158.

respectively, to demonstrate the increasing convexity with term-to-maturity. The amount of
convexity in these two instruments is shown by the areas between the secants and their
respective value curves whose end points are connected by the secants. Clearly, there is a much
larger area of convexity in the 60-year zero value plot and in the 30-year zero value plot.
Accordingly, as traders take into account the available gains from convexity in their pricing,
long-term yields begin to decline as convexity becomes the dominating factor. Any student of
the term structure of interest can observe this common phenomenon, as the impact of convexity
tends to cause spot rates to begin falling beyond 15-28 years. For example, in Figure 2, I have
plotted some randomly selected zero-coupon yield curves across various dates. On each yield
curve, I have placed a mark at the peak yield. Note that the peaks do not occur at the longest
term. I have plotted monthly yield curves from 1941 to 2013 and the findings shown in Figure 2
are typical of what I’ve found. Exceptions are rare.
Figures 1 and 2 here
This reduction cannot be said to be related to expectations for reduced interest rates in the
distant future, but is simply an artifact of the mathematics of convexity. 16 Therefore, a more
reasonable approach would be to use longer-term rates that begin at the 30-year spot rate and
gradually diminish as term increases over the next 30 years by as much as 1-2%, depending on
current volatility. (Higher interest rate volatility creates the opportunity for investors to benefit
more from exposure to positive convexity, and hence gives rise to lower long-term yields.) This

16

Our expectations for future interest rates beyond a few years out have little basis and beyond

30 years are nothing more than a guess without support. See Dybvig and Marshall (1996). This
article considers credit risk, volatility, expectations, duration and convexity.

approximation would still be a conservative way to estimate the pension liabilities. A way to
approximate more closely the unobserved very long-term spot rates is to model them
stochastically by maintaining constant the expected value of future short rates and their volatility
and then deriving mathematically the long rates by capturing the increasingly dominating effect
of convexity as time extends. In either case, it will be noted that the use of increasing spot rates
as time extends beyond 30 years is simply inappropriate and will underestimate the cost of
funding pension liabilities.

Investment Management
The 2012 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Annual Report provides some detail on
pages 35-44 about its asset management program. Although not my primary focus in this
commentary, I offer some observations next.
Overall, it appears to me that a very careful set of protocols and safeguards has been
designed and that conflicts of interest are minimized. Annual assurance statements, an internal
control committee, and external audits form a portion of their management oversight.
PBGC summarizes its approach to investment management on p. 35 of its Annual Report as
follows:
“PBGC uses institutional investment management firms to invest its assets,
subject to PBGC‘s oversight and consistent with the Corporation‘s investment
policy statement approved by its Board. PBGC does not determine the specific
investments to be made but instead relies entirely on its investment managers‘
discretion in executing investments appropriate for their assigned investment
mandates. PBGC does ensure that each investment manager adheres to PBGC

prescribed investment guidelines associated with each investment mandate and
measures each investment manager‘s performance in comparison with agreed
upon benchmarks.” (PBGC 2012: 35.)
It then goes on to explain the segmentation of its investment portfolio, the asset
allocations to each segment, and targeted return benchmarks that are prescribed for managers of
each of its segments. The equity investments fall into two categories: Global Public Stock and
Private Markets. The Global Public Stock sector is further divided into a segment called U.S.
Public Stock, which is comprised of U.S. Equity Securities and Real Estate Investment Trusts,
and into another segment called International Public Stock. Private Markets include private
equity, private debt, and private real estate funds. For example, the “investment policy
establishes a 30 percent target asset allocation for equities and other non-fixed income assets,
and a 70 percent asset allocation for fixed income.” Within these broad categories, finer
distinctions are made. For example, the equity investments fall into two categories: Global
Public Stock and Private Markets. The Global Public Stock sector is further divided into a
segment called U.S. Public Stock, which is comprised of U.S. Equity Securities and Real Estate
Investment Trusts, and into another segment called International Public Stock. Private Markets
include private equity, private debt, and private real estate funds. Within the fixed income
portfolio, there are categories for Treasuries, TIPS, Long Duration, Core, Developed Markets,
High Yield, and Emerging Markets. Money Market is a separate category.
Each of these investment categories is assigned carefully selected performance
benchmarks or target returns. These benchmark indices are among the best known in the
investment community, developed by Barclays, J. P. Morgan, and others. However, it is not clear
to me that any of these benchmarks have anything to do with assets outperforming the pension

liabilities that they are destined to fund. Simply calculating the total rate of return on the assets
and comparing it with any of the widely available generic stock and bond indexes is not
sufficient. It is virtually impossible that such an index or combination of indices would mirror
the insurer’s actual liabilities. The stock and bond market indices couldn’t be expected to match
the duration of PBGC’s liabilities, not to mention their convexity characteristics or other
measures of interest rate sensitivity (e.g., to yield curve twists, duration drift, or changing
volatility).

Establishing a Pension Liability Benchmark
A primary consideration for a pension insurer in assessing the quality of investment
management, particularly if outsourced such as is the case with PBGC, is whether the pension
assets have outperformed the pension liabilities.
To determine whether investment assets have indeed outperformed PBGC’s liabilities, it
must first determine how its pension liabilities have performed. Because pension liabilities are
not traded on an organized public exchange, it is not possible to monitor their behavior directly
and on a continual basis. Therefore, a liability benchmark must be devised, based on traded
securities that will mirror changes in values of the pension liabilities. 17

17

Not every variable influencing the value of liabilities can be mirrored by action in the capital

markets. In pensions the mortality risk cannot be so mirrored. We will work only with the
impacts of changes in the Treasury yield curve because the known effects of those changes
overwhelm any of the more esoteric factors we could hypothesize.

Two characteristics of a pension liability benchmark are of utmost importance. First, the
benchmark must be based on traded securities for which an active market exists. This will allow
PBGC to get reliable quotes on a timely basis. Second, and more importantly, the benchmark
must behave in a manner that closely parallels the present value of the liabilities over time and
under disparate economic circumstances. For example, it should exhibit duration, convexity, and
sensitivity to other broad market forces in which one can take an investment position similar to
that of the liabilities. The difficulty of evaluating certain complex pension liabilities should not
be underestimated. Nonetheless, it must be the starting point for developing an appropriate
investment strategy from an asset/liability management perspective.
The valuation methods are based on replicating the cash flows of the pension liabilities
with capital market instruments and pricing the resulting replicated portfolios with market prices.
This technology gives PBGC the ability to translate its non-traded liabilities into equivalent
capital market portfolios for which there are active markets and therefore reliable price quotes.
Consequently, it is possible to track the market value of PBGC’s pension liabilities over time,
even though they are not actively traded. This process differs from the usual approach of
calculating only a yield and a duration of the liabilities as benchmarks for the asset portfolio
characteristics. The mimicking portfolio has the desirable properties that (1) returns reflect the
shape of the yield curve and the cost of any embedded options, and (2) the effects of important
sources of interest rate risk other than just duration — such as convexity and changing volatility
— are directly incorporated. As noted, many insurers may depend upon duration as the only
characterization of the changes in the value of liabilities. However, our suggested approach
allows a richer representation of the risk and return properties of liabilities, and also one that
easily can be replicated for historical analysis, if desired.

Using a liquid, traded securities portfolio that mimics the liabilities allows for a
straightforward computation of a liability total-rate-of-return index against which the
performance of the assets can be measured. Outperforming this liability index ensures that the
asset managers are, in fact, acting in a manner consistent with increasing the value of PBGC’s
economic surplus (or reducing the size of its deficit). The current practice of measuring asset
managers against a set of arbitrary market indices not only does not ensure this result but gives
management of PBGC, Congress and the taxpayers incorrect information about the status of
PBGC. Indeed, it would be quite possible for outside investment managers to exceed each of
their target indices yet not contribute positively to PBGC’s financial wellbeing. 18 This is because
there is no close relationship between the way that the value of the pension liabilities behaves
over time and the target indices that have been chosen by PBGC.
While a well-constructed portfolio that mimics a mature book of business should not vary
dramatically over time, its composition may change as pensions age and new pension liabilities
are assumed. Consequently, it will be necessary to reevaluate the liabilities periodically and
rebalance the liability benchmark if appropriate.

Example of a Simple, Appropriate Liability Benchmark
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This would have happened during the recent deep recession, for example, when spreads

widened considerably between A-rated long bonds and long Treasury rates. Also and more
obviously, beating a stock market benchmark that fell by 40% would not have helped much
against a (correctly valued) liability that rose in value over the same period.

Consider a closed pension plan in payout phase, assumed by PBGC. After plotting out the
scheduled and expected payment pattern, one could fund it with a portfolio of Treasury zerocoupon bonds, each maturing on a date and in an amount to satisfy the pension outflows. The
price of such a bond portfolio could easily be monitored over time and serve as a basis for
measuring the present value of the remaining pension liability. If the liability extends beyond the
maturity range of Treasury zeros, other measures could be taken, as described earlier, to handle
the very long-term obligations. This liability benchmark would change over time as payment
obligations are satisfied, year-by-year, and when the prices of zeros change occasioned by
changes in market interest rates. This kind of benchmark based on a portfolio of zeros, or another
based on what is known as a “dedicated bond portfolio” wherein bonds are purchased in varying
amounts and maturities in such a way that their aggregate payments at any time are identical to
those of a portfolio of zeros, is appropriate. There may be slightly less expensive ways to
effectively fund the same liabilities with the same level of funding risk – for example, if the
investment managers carefully measure and match the duration, convexity, and drift of the
pension liabilities. 19 But for practical purposes, using the portfolio of zeros benchmark is
sufficient.
For more complex patterns of liability payments, additional Treasury-based securities and
their derivatives may be needed to adequately mirror the liability duration, convexity and drift.

Levels of Performance Measurement
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These approaches are described and tested in Babbel (1983).

Armed with the concept of liability benchmarks, we are now prepared to measure
whether our assets are outperforming our liabilities. Performance attribution requires first a
measure of performance so that there is something to attribute! A useful starting point is to
compare the spread between the actual total rate of return on the combined investment portfolios
and the total rate of change on the overall liability benchmark. We recommend that PBGC
investment managers continue to measure their asset performance on a total-rate-of-return basis,
but compare their performance to the total rate of change on a liability benchmark carefully
constructed to reflect the costs of their liabilities. This liability benchmark (i.e., “liability proxy”)
could be decomposed into various sector benchmarks, where each would be assigned to separate
investment managers, but would be weighted so that in aggregate they would match the overall
liability benchmark. A comprehensive performance measurement system will provide for
evaluation of performance at several levels, 20 as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 here
PBGC could calculate its asset values and liability proxy on a monthly basis. An
assumption would be required for handling intra-month cash flows. Typically, these are assumed
to occur in the middle of the month.
Chaining together monthly total costs and returns allows PBGC to calculate a timeweighted rate of return over any long-term horizon. It eliminates the impact of the actual timing
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A detailed presentation of how to implement such a comprehensive performance

measurement system was derived by Goldman Sachs and is described in Babbel, Stricker and
Vanderhoof, (1990, 1994) and Babbel (1992).

of cash flows over which PBGC and its investment managers have no control. This allows for
unbiased comparisons of performance.
Using a liability benchmark is appropriate for measuring the performance of asset
portfolios funding PBGC’s liabilities.

Epilogue: Not in My Backyard, or Kicking the Can Down the Road?
In designing a portfolio of securities to serve as liability and sub-liability benchmarks, we
recommend the selection of U.S. Treasury securities, their derivatives, and other securities of
minimal default risk. There are several reasons why we favor the inclusion and predominance of
these securities:
• They are liquid and widely traded, and price quotes are easily obtained.
• They are typically the benchmark used for valuing other asset classes and are starting
to be used as a benchmark for valuing insurance liabilities as well.
• Their diversity of characteristics allows them to be combined into portfolios that can
emulate the market value behavior of almost any default-free cash flow stream.
Summary: Not in my backyard, or kicking the can down the road? When a private pension
plan is transferred from the sponsoring company to a private insurance company, as I understand
it, PBGC’s obligations with respect to that plan are relieved at that point. If the insurer later
becomes insolvent, PBGC will not be obligated to assume the pension liabilities. There may be
limited coverage through the National Association of Life and Health Guaranty Association
(NOLHGA) or its state counterparts, but there is no federal responsibility other than some
oversight to ensure that the Plan liabilities have been transferred to what USDOL has termed

“the best available annuity provider,” which is an aspiration with heavy connotations, albeit
subject to various interpretations. This eventuality is what we refer to as “not in my backyard.”
However, when a private pension plan’s obligations and assets are transferred to PBGC,
to the extent that PBGC is using discount rates to value its obligations derived from a survey of
private insurers’ group annuity purchase prices (wherein each insurer has the protection of
limited liability and the option to default), we refer to this action as simply “kicking the can
down the road.” To satisfy its liabilities, PBGC can do one of two things. Either it can invest in
an appropriate set of riskless, matched assets, and maintain an adequate surplus to handle
longevity uncertainties and other contingencies in order to provide the promised benefits, or it
may invest pension assets in whatever kind of portfolio it deems best, providing, however, that it
maintains sufficient excess economic surplus in the plan to cover asset defaults, longevity drift,
and additional contingencies arising from holding such unmatched assets. Otherwise, PBGC is,
in essence, simply transferring the liabilities from one risky pension provider to another (i.e.,
itself). Sooner or later, this will come back to bite them, or the taxpayers who probably will
ultimately have to pay even though they currently provide no explicit guarantee against risky
behavior followed by PBGC. We learned this from the Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac financial
debacles of 2008.
I should note here that current pension valuations by PBGC simply reflect the statutory
guidelines imposed upon it. We have found, in another context, that sound actuarial operating
principles are sometimes sacrificed on the altar of short-term political expediencies, such as what
happened in the two-year reduction in Social Security rates that occurred in 2011-12. More direct
evidence that this can occur, to the detriment of PBGC’s own solvency prospects, is the recent
looting of private pensions in an effort to fund a highway program through a change prescribed

for discount factors used in valuing pension liabilities (the Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century [MAP-21]). Using a moving average of past discount rates is unjustified from a
finance-theoretic viewpoint. Even the Federal Government is unable to sell any of its bonds at or
near face value if they offer interest based on averaged historical rates. The prices garnered will
always reflect current market interest rates. This sort of accounting subterfuge and gimmickry
may be sufficiently complex to keep it off the radar screen of most news outlets and voters, but
knowledgeable people recognize it for what it is.
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Figure 1.
Panel A. Zeros have varying degrees of convexity.

Panel B. Secant showing gain from convexity of 30-year zero.

Panel C. Secant showing larger gain from convexity of 60-year zero.

Figure 1. Notes: Panel A: Zeros have varying degrees of convexity; Panel B: Secant showing
gain from convexity of 30-year zero; Panel C: Secant showing larger gain from convexity of 60year zero. Source: Author’s calculations.

Figure 2. Maximum spot interest rates at various dates. Source: Author’s calculations.

Figure 3. Establishing a liability benchmark for asset management and performance evaluation.
Source: Author’s illustration.

